DISARMAMENT & SECURITY .

An article by Alyn Ware from Unfold Zero

United Nations negotiations for a legal agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons resumed in New York on June 15.

The negotiations look set to achieve the adoption of a historic nuclear ban treaty on July 7. However, States in the negotiations are struggling to find agreement on elements of the treaty that could impact most on the policies and practices of the nuclear-armed States.

Nuclear-armed States and those under extended nuclear deterrence relationships, with the exception of Netherlands, are absent from the negotiations. Netherlands is not expected to join the final treaty. This simplifies the negotiations, as they involve getting agreement from non-nuclear States to prohibit, in their territories, weapons which already they do not support, possess or host.

As such, it is expected that the treaty will be concluded and ready to adopt on July 7, the final day of the negotiations.

In general, the treaty will not affect the policies and practices of the nuclear armed States and their nuclear allies, as long as they remain out of the treaty. However, there are a number of proposed elements of the draft treaty which could impact directly on them. Agreement on these proposals is proving to be difficult to achieve. They include proposals to prohibit the transit of, threat to use, and financing of nuclear weapons.

Transit

Some States and NGOs have proposed that the treaty should prohibit the transit of nuclear weapons through their territorial waters and airspace. States supporting such a ban say that it would be contrary to the purposes of the treaty to ban nuclear weapons in general, but then allow nuclear armed ships and aircraft into one’s ports, territorial waters, airports and skies.

States opposing a ban on transit argue that it would be impossible to implement, verify or enforce such a prohibition. They argue that the nuclear armed States are not transparent about which vessels (ships, submarines, airplanes) are carrying nuclear weapons, and whether vessels carrying nuclear weapons are transiting the waters and airspace of other countries.

However, the experience of New Zealand, which prohibited nuclear weapons in 1987, indicates that it is possible to ensure compliance with a nuclear weapons prohibition on ships, submarines and airplanes making port visits or landings in one’s territory, and that a prohibition on transit through territorial waters and airspace could be adopted without requiring verification.

For a more in-depth discussion on this issue, see The ban treaty, transit and national implementation.

Nuclear deterrence and the threat to use nuclear weapons

The threat to use nuclear weapons is central to the policies and practices of the nuclear armed States and their allies.

Nuclear weapons have not been used in wartime since 1945. Indeed, nuclear armed States have affirmed that the core function of nuclear arsenals is not to use these weapons, but to prevent their use through nuclear deterrence, i.e. the threat of their use. A nuclear ban treaty which is silent on the legality of the threat to use nuclear weapons would therefore provide little challenge to nuclear deterrence policies of the nuclear armed States and their allies.

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Despite (or perhaps because of) this, there is reluctance by a number of the negotiating States to include in the treaty a prohibition on the threat to use nuclear weapons. The initial draft of the treaty did not mention threat of use.

Advocacy by some governments and NGOs, including the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), has managed to get an affirmation of the illegality of the threat to use nuclear weapons into the preamble of the revised draft. (See IALANA: Ban treaty should affirm the current illegality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons).

However, it is uncertain whether a prohibition on threat to use nuclear weapons will make it into the principal obligations in the final treaty. On June 22, IALANA released a Lawyers’ Letter on the abolition of nuclear weapons, endorsed by over 400 members of the legal profession, highlighting the need to codify in the ban treaty the illegality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons.

Financing of nuclear weapons production – stopping the nuclear arms merchants

UNFOLD ZERO, PNND and the Basel Peace Office are campaigning to include in the ban treaty a prohibition on the financing of, and investments in, corporations manufacturing nuclear weapons and their dedicated delivery systems.

Nuclear-armed states currently spend US$100 billion collectively on nuclear weapons programs annually. The corporations manufacturing the weapons and their delivery systems are a major driver of the nuclear arms race. They actively lobby their parliaments and governments to continue allocating the funds to nuclear weapons. And they support think tanks and other public initiatives to promote the ‘need’ for nuclear weapons maintenance, modernization or expansion.

Many non-nuclear States support this through public funds which invest in nuclear weapons corporations, and by permitting banks and other financial institutions in their countries to also invest in these corporations.

If all of the Sates joining the nuclear ban treaty divested their public funds from these corporations, and disallowed banks from investing in them, it could radically change the economics of the nuclear arms industry. It would damage the credibility of and investor confidence in corporations manufacturing nuclear weapons. And it would give support to efforts of parliamentarians and civil society in the nuclear arms States to cut the exorbitant nuclear arms budgets and re-direct these funds to health, education, jobs, environment and sustainable development.

A number of States participating in the nuclear ban treaty negotiations have supported the proposal that the treaty prohibit financing of, and investments in, nuclear weapons. However, other States argue that this would be too difficult to implement, despite the fact that a number of countries (Lichtenstein, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland) have already implemented nuclear divestment policies.

UNFOLD ZERO, PNND and Basel Peace Office submitted a working paper to the UN negotiations on this issue. In addition, we held a press conference and addressed an informal session of negotiating States at the UN in Geneva on June 1-2, and gave an Intervention on financing of nuclear weapons to the UN negotiations in New York on June 19.

The final ban treaty, which we expect to be adopted on July 7, will provide support for nuclear divestment regardless of whether it includes a specific prohibition on financing of nuclear weapons production, or a more general prohibition on assisting nuclear weapons production. We therefore plan to launch a global nuclear weapons divestment campaign following the adoption of the treaty.

DISARMAMENT & SECURITY .

An article from the United Nations

President Presents Revised Preamble, Noting Proposed Addition of New Paragraphs

Delegations considering an instrument that would prohibit nuclear weapons concluded their first-read through of the entire draft this morning [June 21], before proceeding to informal discussions in the afternoon.

prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, resumed its consideration of Articles 11 to 21 (document A/CONF.229/2017/CRP.1).

 Having begun the discussion yesterday afternoon, delegates continued to present their positions, making amendments and suggesting revisions to language in the draft.

Ecuador’s representative, noting the “legal confusion” contained in the draft instrument under consideration, emphasized that the negotiations currently under way and the outcome instrument were not intended merely to complement prior agreements.  “We came here to negotiate a separate instrument, even though it is still related to the wider architecture of disarmament.”

Indonesia’s representative reiterated a sentiment expressed yesterday about Article 11, concerning “amendments”, underlining the need to clarify who exactly could make changes to the final instrument.  On another note, he said that although it was the sovereign right of each State party to withdraw from any instrument, provisions must be put in place to ensure that was done in the “most proper way”.  Any withdrawal must be taken very seriously, he added.

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Fiji’s representative echoed statements made by several other Pacific delegations throughout discussions in pointing out that nuclear testing had unfortunately come to define the region.  Expressing “utmost faith” that the draft instrument would be a “game-changer”, not only for the Pacific but also the entire world, he voiced support for Article 17, which states that the articles are not subject to reservations.  Such a clause would make the instrument most effective, he said.

Conference President Elayne Whyte Gómez (Costa Rica) presented a revised version of the preamble to the draft instrument, noting that a total of three dozen new paragraphs had been proposed.  She said that, in trying to address all suggestions, she had incorporated proposals that could take the preamble towards consensus, adding that she had also tried to consolidate proposals that would ensure strict avoidance of repetitions in the text.  The preamble must be as short as possible in order to be similar to that of related legal instruments.

Highlighting some of the most significant changes, she said that she had tried, in paragraph 2, to incorporate the risk posed by nuclear weapons to people, health and humanity’s very survival.  Paragraph 3 had been expanded to incorporate the disproportionate impact of nuclear-weapon activities on indigenous peoples.  A paragraph on relationships with other instruments had also been consolidated by the addition of a reference to the pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.  Also added to the last paragraph of the draft preamble — as suggested by several delegations — were references to the role of civil society and academia in furthering the principles of humanity.

Also speaking today were representatives of Mexico, Venezuela, Singapore, Thailand, Nigeria, Philippines, Peru, Guatemala, Malaysia, Argentina and Brazil.

Others addressing the meeting were speakers representing the following entities:  the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Pace University, the International Disarmament Institute and the Centre for International Security and Policy Studies (Kazakhstan).

The Conference will reconvene in open session at a date and time to be announced.

DISARMAMENT & SECURITY .

An article by Alice Slater for World Beyond War

This week [on May 22], the Chair of an exciting UN initiative formally named the “United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading Towards their Total Elimination” released a draft treaty to ban and prohibit nuclear weapons just as the world has done for biological and chemical weapons.  The Ban Treaty is to be negotiated at the UN from June 15 to July 7 as a follow up to the one week of negotiations that took place this past March, attended by more than 130 governments interacting with civil society.  Their input and suggestions were used by the Chair, Costa Rica’s ambassador to the UN, Elayne Whyte Gómez to prepare the draft treaty. It is expected that the world will finally come out of this meeting with a treaty to ban the bomb!

This negotiating conference was established after a series of meetings in Norway, Mexico, and Austria with governments and civil society to examine the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear war.  The meetings were inspired by the leadership and urging of the International Red Cross to look at the horror of nuclear weapons, not just through the frame of strategy and “deterrence”, but to grasp and examine the disastrous humanitarian consequences that would occur in a nuclear war.   This activity led to a series of meetings culminating in a resolution in the UN General Assembly this fall to negotiate a treaty to ban and prohibit nuclear weapons. The new draft treaty based on the proposals put forth in the March negotiations requires the states to “never under any circumstances … develop, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess, or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices … use nuclear weapons …  carry out any nuclear weapon test”. States are also required to destroy any nuclear weapons they possess and are prohibited from transferring nuclear weapons to any other recipient.
None of the nine nuclear weapons states, US, UK, Russia, France, China, Indian, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea came to the March meeting, although during the vote last fall on whether to go forward with the negotiating resolution in the UN’s First Committee for Disarmament, where the resolution was formally introduced, while the five western nuclear states voted against it, China, India and Pakistan abstained.   And North Korea voted for the resolution to negotiate to ban the bomb! (I bet you didn’t read that in the New York Times!)

By the time the resolution got to the General Assembly, Donald Trump had been elected and those promising votes disappeared.  And at the March negotiations, the US Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, flanked by the Ambassadors from England and France, stood outside the closed conference room and held a press conference with a number of  “umbrella states”  which rely on the US nuclear ‘deterrent” to annihilate their enemies (includes NATO  states as well as Australia, Japan, and South Korea)  and announced that “as a mother” who couldn’t want more for her family “than a world without nuclear weapons” she had to “be realistic” and would boycott the meeting and oppose efforts to ban the bomb adding, “Is there anyone that believes that North Korea would agree to a ban on nuclear weapons?”

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The last 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) five year review conference broke up without consensus on the shoals of a deal the US was unable to deliver to Egypt to hold a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone Conference in the Middle East.  This promise was made in 1995 to get the required consensus vote from all the states to extend the NPT indefinitely when it was due to expire, 25 years after the five nuclear weapons states in the treaty, US, UK,  Russia, China, and France, promised in 1970 to make “good faith efforts” for nuclear disarmament.  In that agreement all the other countries of the world promised not to get nuclear weapons, except for India, Pakistan, and Israel who never signed and went on to get their own bombs. North Korea had signed the treaty, but took advantage of the NPT’s Faustian bargain to sweeten the pot with a promise to the non-nuclear weapons states for an “inalienable right” to “peaceful” nuclear power, thus giving them the keys to the bomb factory. North Korea got its peaceful nuclear power, and walked out of the treaty to make a bomb.    At the 2015 NPT review, South Africa gave an eloquent speech expressing the state of nuclear apartheid that exists between the nuclear haves, holding the whole world hostage to their security needs and their failure to comply with their obligation to eliminate their nuclear bombs, while working overtime to prevent nuclear proliferation in other countries.

The Ban Treaty draft provides that the Treaty will enter into effect when 40 nations sign and ratify it.  Even if none of the nuclear weapons states join, the ban can be used to stigmatize and shame the “umbrella” states to withdraw from the nuclear “protection” services they are now receiving.    Japan should be an easy case.   The five NATO states in Europe who keep US nuclear weapons based on their soil–Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Turkey– are good prospects for breaking with the nuclear alliance.  A legal ban on nuclear weapons can be used to convince banks and pension funds in a divestment campaign, once it is known the weapons are illegal.   See www.dontbankonthebomb.com

Right now people are organizing all over the world for a Women’s March to Ban the Bomb on June 17, during the ban treaty negotiations, with a big march and rally planned in New York.   See https://www.womenbanthebomb.org/

We need to get as many countries to the UN as possible this June, and pressure our parliaments and capitals to vote to join the treaty to ban the bomb.   And we need to talk it up and let people know that something great is happening now!    To get involved, check out www.icanw.org

DISARMAMENT & SECURITY .

A synopsis of the analysis made by the International Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons.

In addition to the vote on resolution 71/71 last December, the following analysis is based on whether or not a country is participating in the ongoing negotiations for the treaty and whether or not it has made a public commitment in favor of a ban on nuclear weapons.

FOR THE TREATY

The treaty is supported by all of the African countries except Mali (unclear), all of the Latin American countries except Nicaragua (unclear), and all countries of the Arab region except Morocco, Sudan and Syria (all unclear). No country from these regions is clearly against the treaty. With the exception of the nuclear countries, Japan and South Korea, the other countries of South and East Asia are for the treaty, as well as countries of the Pacific other than Australia and Micronesia.

AGAINST THE TREATY

Here are the countries that are clearly against the treaty:

All of the nuclear countries: China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States

Most European countries: Albania, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Ukraine.

Other allies of Europe and the U.S.: Australia, Canada, Japan, Micronesia, South Korea, Turkey.

Austria, Ireland, Sweden, Netherlands and Switzerland are the only major European countries that are not clearly against the treaty. Austria, Ireland and Sweden clearly support the treaty. Netherlands and Switzerland abstained from the vote and, unlike most other European countries, they are participating in the ongoing negotiations.

UNCLEAR POSITION

Many former republics of the Soviet Union are unclear about their position: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Uzbekistan

Other countries that are unclear about their support are Andorra, Finland, Mali, Monaco, Morocco, Nicaragua, Sudan, Syria.

Can we abolish all nuclear weapons?

DISARMAMENT & SECURITY .

Statement published on the website of Reaching Critical Will

This statement was delivered by Ms. Ray Acheson, Director of WILPF’s disarmament programme Reaching Critical Will, to the 2017 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee in Vienna, Austria on 3 May 2017.

All of the nuclear-armed states—including those that are states parties to the NPT—are investing in the expansion, development, or so-called modernisation of their nuclear arsenals. These programmes are not just about “increasing the safety and security” of nuclear weapon systems, which is what the nuclear-armed states claim. The “upgrades” in many cases provide new capabilities to the weapon systems. They also extend the lives of these weapon systems beyond the middle of this century, ensuring that the arms race will continue indefinitely.

China is transitioning from liquid-fueled slow-launching missiles to solid-fuel, quicker-launching road-mobile missiles, to make the force more “useable”. Recently China has also sped up the modernisation of its sea-based strategic force, replacing its first generation ballistic nuclear missile-carrying submarines.[i]

France has replaced its sea-launched ballistic missiles for its current class of submarines,[ii] and is also planning to develop new missiles for a new class of submarines.[iii] It has carried out studies for a next-generation air-launched cruise missile.[iv] Half of its nuclear bomber force has been upgraded so far.

Russia is modernising its main silo- and road-mobile ICBM.[v] It is also developing a new silo-based ICBM,[vi] and is upgrading its ballistic missile submarine force.[vii] It’s also working on its nuclear attack submarines and nuclear-capable cruise missiles,[viii] as well as its bombers.[ix]

The UK parliament voted in favour in July 2016 of renewing its Trident nuclear weapon system. This means that the UK’s Vanguard-class submarines will be replaced with the “Dreadnought”-class of submarines.[x] In 2019, the UK will also make a decision about the design of a new warhead.[xi]

The United States is developing a new class of ballistic missile submarines, a new long-range bomber with nuclear capability, a new air-launched cruise missile, a next-generation land-based ICBM, and a new nuclear-capable tactical fighter aircraft. It will also include work on warheads and nuclear command and control facilities.[xii]

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More examples, including from non-NPT states parties, can be found in WILPF’s updated study Assuring destruction forever.[xiii]

The only way to prevent states from modernising their nuclear weapons is to prohibit and eliminate these weapons. In the meantime, NPT states parties are already legally obligated to end the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament.

This NPT outcome should reflect the serious concern expressed by many states parties about modernisation and development of nuclear weapon systems, and call for the cessation of such programmes, which violate article VI of the NPT and entrench double standards.

[i] “Annual Report to Congress – Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 24 April 2014, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf.
[ii] Julien Bonnet, “Tir d’essai réussi pour le missile nucléaire M51,” L’UsineNouvelle, 1 July 2016; “Successful M51 Ballistic Missile SLBM Test by French Defense Procurement Agency DGA,” Navy Recognition, 30 September 2015.
[iii] Speech by François Hollande, Visit to the Strategic Air Forces, 25 February 2015, http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/vues/Kiosque/FranceDiplomatie/kiosque.php?fichier=baen2015-02-25.html.
[iv] JeanYves Le Drian, Defense Minister, Closing Remarks – Symposium for 50 Years of Deterrence, 20 November 2014, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ministre/prises-de-parole-du-ministre/prises-de-parole-de-m.-jean-yves-le-drian/discours-de-cloture-du-colloque-pour-les-50-ans-de-la-dissuasion.
[v] Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian nuclear forces, 2017,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 73, No. 2, pp. 119–120; Pavel Podvig, “Flight tests of Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM are said to begin in 2019,” Russian strategic nuclear forces, 19 January 2017.
[vi] Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, op. cit., p. 120.
[vii] Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, op. cit., p. 121.
[viii] Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, op. cit., p. 123.
[ix] Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, op. cit., p. 122.
[x] John Ainslie, The Trident shambles, Scottish CND, March 2016, http://www.banthebomb.org/images/stories/pdfs/shambles.pdf.
[xi] National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, op. cit., p. 35.
[xii] Kristensen and Norris, op. cit., p. 49.
[xiii] See http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Publications/modernization/assuring-destruction-forever-2017.pdf.