.DISARMAMENT & SECURITY.

An article by Unfold Zero

On July 7, 2017, the United Nations adopted a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons following negotiations over 5 weeks during March, June and July. 122 countries voted in favour of the treaty, demonstrating the clear and unequivocal acceptance of the majority of UN members never to use, threaten to use, produce, possess, acquire, transfer, test or deploy nuclear weapons. The treaty will be open for signature on September 20 and will enter-into-force once 50 States ratify.

UNFOLD ZERO promoted the negotiations, and was actively involved in them – submitting working papers, making interventions and organising side events. We are now active in the treaty implementation and follow-up. 

Impact on the nuclear armed and allied States?

The nuclear-armed and allied States opposed the treaty and none are likely to join. As such they are not bound by its provisions, and will not be directly affected by it.

However, the new treaty could be used to impact on the policies and practices of the nuclear armed States and their allies in two key ways:

1 through national implementation measures that prohibit financing and transit of nuclear weapons;

2 by putting political pressure on these States to adopt nuclear risk reduction and disarmament measures, including through the Non-Proliferation Treaty process and at the 2018 UN High-Level Conference on Nuclear Disarmament. 

National implementation: Prohibiting nuclear weapons investments

The nuclear prohibition treaty could impact on nuclear weapons policies if it results in divestment by States parties and others from corporations manufacturing nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

These corporations (list compiled by Don’t Bank on the Bomb) are a major driver of the nuclear arms race. They actively lobby their parliaments and governments to continue allocating the funds to nuclear weapons. And they support think tanks and other public initiatives to promote the ‘need’ for nuclear weapons maintenance, modernization and expansion.

Many of the countries supporting the nuclear prohibition treaty have public funds (such as national pension funds), and banks operating in their countries, that invest in these corporations.

The new treaty does not specifically prohibit such investments. However, States parties to the treaty agree not to ‘assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty.’  This can be interpreted as prohibiting investments in nuclear weapons corporations.

If a number of States Parties to the treaty, encouraged by their parliamentarians and civil society, decide to prohibit investments in nuclear weapons corporations as part of their national implementation measures, this could highlight the unethical corporate practice of manufacturing such weapons, damage the standing of such corporations and constrain their lobbying power.

UNFOLD ZERO and our partner organisations are therefore stepping up our Move the Nuclear Weapons Money campaign in order to dramatically increase the number of countries divesting from nuclear weapons corporations, focusing on those countries joining the nuclear prohibition treaty.

We are also supporting nuclear weapons divestment by cities, universities and religious institutions in nuclear-armed and allied countries, building on the example of the city of Cambridge MA (USA).

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Can we abolish all nuclear weapons?

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This divestment campaign is coupled with campaigns in the nuclear-armed States to drastically cut nuclear weapons budgets and re-direct these resources into economic, social and envirnomental need, such as prmooting renewable energy and protecting the climate.

For more information see Move the Nuclear Weapons Money: A handbook for civil society and legislators’ or contact us at UNFOLD ZERO. 

National implementation: prohibiting transit

One step that States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could take that would impact directly on the policies and practices of the nuclear armed states is to prohibit the transit of nuclear weapons through their territorial waters and airspace.

The new treaty infers that allowing such transit by nuclear-armed states would be in violation of the treaty provision under which States parties to the treaty agree not to ”assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty.’ However, the treaty leaves it up to each State party on how they implement this provision.

Some of the countries in the UN negotiations on the treaty argued that a ban on transit would be too difficult to implement, verify and enforce, especially as the nuclear-armed States refuse to confirm or deny which ships and airplanes are carrying nuclear weapons.

However, UNFOLD ZERO partner organisations Aotearoa (New Zealand) Lawyers for Peace and PNND submitted a paper to the prohibition treaty negotiations reviewing the experience of New Zealand, a country which has adopted legislation prohibiting transit of nuclear weapons and has been successful in implementing this. We are therefore encouraging States Parties to the treaty to include a prohibition on transit in their national implementation measures.

Nuclear armed and allied States have easily dismissed the Treaty on the prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as not relevant to them and which they can ignore. It is not so easy for them to ignore the 2018 UN High-Level Conference on Nuclear Disarmament (2018 UNHLC).

There is a general expectation (from media, parliaments, civil society and other governments) that governments will participate in UN high-level conferences at the highest level, i.e. by the President or Prime Minister, and that these conferences will deliver concrete outcomes.

As such, recent UN high-level conferences have been very successful, resulting in the adoption of the sustainable development goals, Paris agreement on climate change, NY declaration on refugees and migrants and the 14-point action plan to protect the oceans.

Already the 56 member parliaments of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (which includes the parliaments of four nuclear armed and all the NATO countries) have called ”on all participating OSCE States to participate in the 2018 UN international conference on nuclear disarmament at the highest level, to include parliamentarians in their delegations to the conference and to pursue the adoption of nuclear risk reduction, transparency and disarmament measures at the conference.” (Tblisi Declaration, adopted July 5, 2016)

The ban treaty could be used to put additional pressure on the nuclear-armed and allied states to undertake such measures.

The 2018 UNHLC could also be an opportunity for non-nuclear countries to announce their ratification of the nuclear prohibition treaty. If 50 ratifications are achieved by the 2018 UNHLC, then this could be the occasion to announce its entry-into-force.

UNFOLD ZERO is coordinating civil society action for the 2018 UNHLC in cooperation with the Abolition 2000 Working Group on the 2018 UNHLC. Please contact us at info@unfoldzero.org if you would like to be more involved.

. DISARMAMENT & SECURITY.

An article by the International Red Cross

Over 120 countries today adopted a landmark treaty banning nuclear weapons. The agreement comes at a time when the world has again been reminded of the threat of nuclear weapons.

“Today, the world has taken an historic step towards de-legitimising these indiscriminate and inhumane weapons, which is a crucial basis for their future elimination,” said ICRC President Peter Maurer speaking in Geneva. “The agreement is an important victory for our shared humanity.

“For too long nuclear weapons have remained the only weapon of mass destruction not explicitly prohibited in international law. The treaty adopted today fills this gap,” he said.

The ICRC has actively participated in the negotiations at the United Nations in New York which adopted the treaty. It advocated that the treaty recognize the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, that it be based on international humanitarian law, and that it contain a clear and unambiguous prohibition.

The treaty adopted on Friday meets these objectives. It provides a solid foundation for resisting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and forges a path towards their eventual elimination. It will enter into force when 50 States have ratified the treaty, an effort that will be supported by the ICRC and Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies around the world.

Speaking at the negotiations, the Head of the ICRC’s Arms Unit, Kathleen Lawand, praised States for reaching agreement. She said, “The treaty will reinforce the stigma against the use of nuclear weapons. Yet, we know that the adoption of this treaty by itself will not make nuclear weapons disappear overnight. Our collective work is far from complete.”

The ICRC, along with the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, have long called for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. In 1945, ICRC doctors were among the first to respond to the devastation following the use of atomic bombs in Japan. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences were clear then, and the suffering continues today.

“Nuclear weapons are some of the most terrifying weapons ever invented. They cause unspeakable human suffering and irreversible environmental harm and are a threat to the survival of humanity itself,” said President Maurer.

Can we abolish all nuclear weapons?

. DISARMAMENT & SECURITY.

A blog by Richard Falk

On 7 July 2017 122 countries at the UN voted to approve the text of a proposed international treaty entitled ‘Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.’ The treaty is formally open for signature in September, but it only become a binding legal instrument according to its own provisions 90 days after the 50th country deposits with the UN Secretary General its certification that the treaty has been ratified in accordance with their various constitutional processes.

In an important sense, it is incredible that it took 72 years after the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to reach this point of setting forth this unconditional prohibition of any use or threat of nuclear weapons [Article 1(e)] within the framework of a multilateral treaty negotiated under UN auspices. The core obligation of states that choose to become parties to the treaty is very sweeping. It prohibits any connection whatsoever with the weaponry by way of possession, deployment, testing, transfer, storage, and production [Article 1(a)].

The Nuclear Ban Treaty (NBT) is significant beyond the prohibition. It can and should be interpreted as a frontal rejection of the geopolitical approach to nuclearism, and its contention that the retention and development of nuclear weapons is a proven necessity given the way international society is organized. It is a healthy development that the NBT shows an impatience toward and a distrust of the elaborate geopolitical rationalizations of the nuclear status quo that have ignored the profound objections to nuclearism of many governments and the anti-nuclear views that have long dominated world public opinion. The old reassurances about being committed to nuclear disarmament as soon as an opportune moment arrives increasingly lack credibility as the nuclear weapons states, led by the United States, make huge investments in the modernization and further development of their nuclear arsenals.

Despite this sense of achievement, it must be admitted that there is a near fatal weakness, or at best, the gaping hole in this newly cast net of prohibition established via the NBT process. True, 122 governments lends weight to the claim that the international community, by a significant majority has signaled in an obligatory way a repudiation of nuclear weapons for any and all purposes, and formalized their prohibition of any action to the contrary. The enormous fly in this healing ointment arises from the refusal of any of the nine nuclear weapons states to join in the NBT process even to the legitimating extent of participating in the negotiating conference with the opportunity to express their objections and influence the outcome. As well, most of the chief allies of these states that are part of the global security network of states relying directly and indirectly on nuclear weaponry also boycotted the entire process. It is also discouraging to appreciate that several countries in the past that had lobbied against nuclear weapons with great passion such as India, Japan, and China were notably absent, and also opposed the prohibition. This posture of undisguised opposition to this UN sponsored undertaking to delegitimize nuclearism, while reflecting the views of a minority of governments, must be taken extremely seriously. It includes all five permanent members of the Security Council and such important international actors as Germany and Japan.

The NATO triangle of France, United Kingdom, and the United States, three of the five veto powers in the Security Council, angered by its inability to prevent the whole NBT venture, went to the extreme of issuing a Joint Statement of denunciation, the tone of which was disclosed by a defiant assertion removing any doubt as to the abiding commitment to a nuclearized world order: “We do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party to it. Therefore, there will be no change in the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons.” The body of the statement contended that global security depended upon maintaining the nuclear status quo, as bolstered by the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 and by the claim that it was “the policy of nuclear deterrence, which has been essential to keeping the peace in Europe and North Asia for over 70 years.” It is relevant to take note of the geographic limits associated with the claimed peace-maintaining benefits of nuclear weaponry, which ignores the ugly reality that devastating warfare has raged throughout this period outside the feared mutual destruction of the heartlands of geopolitical rivals, a central shared forbearance by the two nuclear superpowers throughout the entire Cold War. During these decades of rivalry, the violent dimensions of geopolitical rivalry were effectively outsourced to the non-Western regions of the world during the Cold War, and subsequently, causing massive suffering and widespread devastation for many vulnerable peoples inhabiting the Global South. Such a conclusion suggests that even if we were to accept the claim on behalf on nuclear weapons as deserving of credit for avoiding a major war, specifically World War III, that ‘achievement’ was accomplished at the cost of millions, probably tens of millions, of civilian lives in non-Western societies. Beyond this, the achievement involved a colossally irresponsible gamble with the human future, and succeeded as much due to good luck as to the rationality attributed to deterrence theory and practice.

NBT itself does not itself challenge the Westphalian framework of state-centrism by setting forth a framework of global legality that is issued under the authority of ‘the international community’ or the UN as the authoritative representative of the peoples of the world. Its provisions are carefully formulated as imposing obligation only with respect to ‘State parties,’ that is, governments that have deposited the prescribed ratification and thereby become formal adherents of the treaty. Even Article 4, which hypothetically details how nuclear weapons states should divest themselves of all connections with the weaponry limits its claims to State parties, and offers no guidance whatsoever in the event of suspected or alleged non-compliance. Reliance is placed in Article 5 on a commitment to secure compliance by way of the procedures of ‘national implementation.’

The treaty does aspire to gain eventual universality through the adherence of all states over time, but in the interim the obligations imposed are of minimal substantive relevance beyond the agreement of the non-nuclear parties not to accept deployment or other connections with the weaponry. It is for another occasion, but I believe a strong case can be made under present customary international law, emerging global law, and abiding natural law that the prohibitions in the NBT are binding universally independent of whether a state chooses or not to become a party to the treaty.

Taking an unnecessary further step to reaffirm statism, and specifically, ‘national sovereignty’ as the foundation of world order, Article 17 gives parties to the NBT a right of withdrawal. All that state parties have to do is give notice, accompanied by a statement of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ that have ‘jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.’ The withdrawal will take effect twelve months after the notice and statement are submitted. There is no procedure in the treaty by which the contention of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ can be challenged as unreasonable or made in bad faith. It is an acknowledgement that even for these non-nuclear states, nothing in law or morality or human wellbeing takes precedence over the exercise of sovereign rights. Article 17 is not likely to be invoked in the foreseeable future. This provision reminds us of this strong residual unwillingness to supersede national interests by deference to global and human interests. The withdrawal option is also important because it confirms that national security continues to take precedence over international law, even with respect to genocidal weaponry of mass destruction. As such the obligation undertaken by parties to the NBT are reversible in ways that are not present in multilateral conventions outlawing genocide, apartheid, and torture.

Given these shortcomings, is it nevertheless reasonable for nuclear abolitionists to claim a major victory by virtue of tabling such a treaty? Considering that the nuclear weapons states and their allies have all rejected the process and even those within the circle of the intended legal prohibition reserve a right of withdrawal, the NBT is likely to be brushed aside by cynics as mere wishful thinking and by dedicated anti-nuclearists as more of an occasion for hemlock than champagne. The cleavage between the nuclear weapons states and the rest of the world has never been starker, and there are absent any signs on either side of the divide to make the slightest effort to find common ground, and there may be none. As of now, it is a standoff between two forms of asymmetry. The nuclear states enjoy a preponderance of hard power, while the anti-nuclear states have the upper hand when it comes to soft power, including solid roots in ‘substantive democracy,’ ‘global law,’ and ‘natural law.’

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The hard power solution to nuclearism has essentially been reflexive, that is, relying on nuclearism as shaped by the leading nuclear weapons states. What this has meant in practice is some degree of self-restraint on the battlefield and crisis situations (there is a nuclear taboo without doubt, although it has never been seriously tested), and, above all, a delegitimizing one-sided implementation of the Nonproliferation Treaty regime. This one-sidedness manifests itself in two ways: (1) discriminatory administration of the underlying non-proliferation norm, most unreservedly in the case of Israel; as well, the excessive enforcement of the nonproliferation norm beyond the limits of either the NPT itself or the UN Charter, as with Iraq (2003), and currently by way of threats of military attack against North Korea and Iran. Any such uses of military force would be non-defensive and unlawful unless authorized by a Security Council resolution supported by all five permanent members, and at least four other states, which fortunately remains unlikely. [UN Charter, Article 27(3)] More likely is recourse to unilateral coercion led by the countries that issued the infamous joint declaration denouncing the NBT as was the case for the U.S. and the UK with regard to recourse to the war against Iraq, principally rationalized as a counter-proliferation undertaking, which turned out itself to be a rather crude pretext for mounting an aggressive war, showcasing ‘shock and awe’ tactics.

(2) The failure to respect the obligations imposed on the nuclear weapons states to negotiate in good faith an agreement to eliminate these weapons by verified and prudent means, and beyond this to seek agreement on general and complete disarmament. It should have been evident, almost 50 years after the NPT came into force in 1970 that nuclear weapons states have breached their material obligations under the treaty, which were validated by an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996 that included a unanimous call for the implementation of these Article VI legal commitments. Drawing this conclusion from deeds as well as words, it is evident for all with eyes that want to see, that the nuclear weapons states as a group have opted for deterrence as a permanent security scheme and nonproliferation as its management mechanism.

One contribution of the NBT is convey to the world the crucial awareness of these 122 countries as reinforced by global public opinion that the deterrence/NPT approach to global peace and security is neither prudent nor legitimate nor a credible pathway leading over time to the end of nuclearism.

In its place, the NBT offers its own two-step approach—first, an unconditional stigmatizing of the use or threat of nuclear weapons to be followed by a negotiated process seeking nuclear disarmament. Although the NBT is silent about demilitarizing geopolitics and conventional disarmament, it is widely assumed that latter stages of denuclearization would not be implemented unless they involved these broader assaults on the war system. The NBT is also silent about the relevance of nuclear power capabilities, which inevitably entail a weapons option given widely available current technological knowhow. The relevance of nuclear energy technology would have to be addressed at some stage of nuclear disarmament.

Having suggested these major shortcomings of treaty coverage and orientation, can we, should we cast aside these limitations, and join in the celebrations and renewed hopes of civil society activists to rid the world of nuclear weapons? My esteemed friend and colleague, David Krieger, who has dedicated his life to keeping the flame of discontent about nuclear weapons burning and serves as the longtime and founding President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, concludes his informed critique of the Joint Statement by NATO leaders, with this heartening thought: “Despite the resistance of the U.S., UK and France, the nuclear ban treaty marks the beginning of the end of the nuclear age.” [Krieger, “U.S., UK and France Denounce the Nuclear Ban Treaty”]. I am not at all sure about this, although Krieger’s statement leaves open the haunting uncertainty of how long it might take to move from this ‘beginning’ to the desired ‘end.’ Is it as self-styled ‘nuclear realists’ like to point out, no more than an ultimate goal, which is polite coding for the outright dismissal of nuclear disarmament as ‘utopian’ or ‘unattainable’?

We should realize that there have been many past ‘beginnings of the end’ since 1945 that have not led us any closer to the goal of the eliminating the scourge of nuclearism from the face of the earth. It is a long and somewhat arbitrary list, including the immediate horrified reactions of world leaders to the atomic bomb attacks at the end of World War II, and what these attacks suggested about the future of warfare; the massive anti-nuclear civil disobedience campaigns that briefly grabbed mass attention in several nuclear weapons states; tabled disarmament proposals by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1960s; the UN General Assembly Resolution 1653 (XVI) that in 1961 declared threat or use of nuclear weapons to be unconditionally unlawful under the UN Charter and viewed any perpetrator as guilty of a crime against humanity; the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 that scared many into the momentary realization that it was not tolerable to coexist with nuclear weapons; the International Court of Justice majority opinion in 1996 responding to the General Assembly’s question about the legality of nuclear weapons that limited the possibility of legality of use to the narrow circumstance of responding to imminent threats to the survival of a sovereign state; the apparent proximity to an historic disarmament arrangements agreed to by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev at a summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland in 1986; the extraordinary opening provided by the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which should have been the best possible ‘beginning of the end,’ and yet nothing happened; and finally, Barack Obama’s Prague speech is 2009 (echoing sentiments expressed less dramatically by Jimmy Carter in 1977, early in his presidency) in which he advocated to great acclaim dedicated efforts to achieve toward the elimination of nuclear weapons if not in his lifetime, at least as soon as possible; it was a good enough beginning for a Nobel Peace Prize, but then one more fizzle.

Each of these occasions briefly raised the hopes of humanity for a future freed from a threat of nuclear war, and its assured accompanying catastrophe, and yet there was few, if any, signs of progress from each of these beginnings greeted so hopefully toward the ending posited as a goal. Soon disillusionment, denial, and distraction overwhelmed the hopes raised by these earlier initiatives, with the atmosphere of hope in each instance replaced by an aura of nuclear complacency, typified by indifference and denial. It is important to acknowledge that the bureaucratic and ideological structures supporting nuclearism are extremely resilient, and have proved adept at outwaiting the flighty politics of periodic flurries of anti-nuclear activism.

And after a lapse of years, yet another new beginning is now being proclaimed. We need to summon and sustain greater energy than in the past if we are to avoid this fate of earlier new beginnings in relation to the NBT. Let this latest beginning start a process that moves steadily toward the end that has been affirmed. We know that the NBT would not itself have moved forward without civil society militancy and perseverance at every stage. The challenge now is to discern and then take the next steps, and not follow the precedents of the past that followed the celebration of a seeming promising beginning with a misplaced reliance on the powers that be to handle the situation, and act accordingly. In the past, the earlier beginnings were soon buried, acute concerns eventually resurfaced, and yet another new beginning was announced with fanfare while the earlier failed beginning were purged from collective memory.

Here, we can at least thank the infamous Joint Statement for sending a clear signal to civil society and the 122 governments voting their approval of the NBT text that if they are truly serious about ending nuclearism, they will have to carry on the fight, gathering further momentum, and seeking to reach a tipping point where these beginnings of the end gain enough traction to become a genuine political project, and not just another harmless daydream or well-intended empty gesture.

As of now the NBT is a treaty text that courteously mandates the end of nuclearism, but to convert this text into an effective regime of control will require the kind of deep commitments, sacrifices, movements, and struggles that eventually achieved the impossible, ending such entrenched evils as slavery, apartheid, and colonialism.

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A news release from the United Nations

Countries meeting at a United Nations conference in New York today (July 7) adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the first multilateral legally-binding instrument for nuclear disarmament to have been negotiated in 20 years.

The remains of the Prefectural Industry Promotion Building, later preserved as a monument – known as the Genbaku Dome – at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial. UN Photo

“The treaty represents an important step and contribution towards the common aspirations of a world without nuclear weapons,” the spokesperson for Secretary-General António Guterres said following its adoption.

“The Secretary-General hopes that this new treaty will promote inclusive dialogue and renewed international cooperation aimed at achieving the long overdue objective of nuclear disarmament,” Stéphane Dujarric added.

The treaty – adopted by a vote of 122 in favour to one against (Netherlands), with one abstention (Singapore) – prohibits a full range of nuclear-weapon-related activities, such as undertaking to develop, test, produce, manufacture, acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the use or threat of use of these weapons.

[Click here to read the treaty]

“We feel emotional because we are responding to the hopes and dreams of the present and future generations,” said Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez of Costa Rica, who serves as the President of the conference that negotiated the treaty in response to a mandate given by the UN General Assembly.

She told a news conference at UN Headquarters that with the treaty the world is “one step closer” to a total elimination of nuclear weapons.

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The treaty will be open for signature to all States at UN Headquarters in New York on 20 September 2017, and enter into force 90 days after it has been ratified by at least 50 countries.

However, a number of countries stayed out of the negotiations, including the United States, Russia and other nuclear-weapon States, as well as many of their allies. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) did not join the talks either.

In a joint press statement issued today, the delegations of the United States, United Kingdom and France said they “have not taken part in the negotiation of the treaty… and do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party to it.”

“This initiative clearly disregards the realities of the international security environment,” they said. “Accession to the ban treaty is incompatible with the policy of nuclear deterrence, which has been essential to keeping the peace in Europe and North Asia for over 70 years.”

In response to questions on the joint statement, Ms. Whyte Gómez recalled that when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was adopted decades ago, it did not enjoy a large number of accessions.

Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. Then in 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States that are the permanent members of the UN Security Council – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In the beginning, it was unimaginable that those States would be parties to the NPT, she noted. “But the world changes and the circumstances change.”

She added that the hibakusha, survivors of nuclear bombs, have been the driving force in the creation of the nuclear weapons prohibition treaty. The experiences they have been sharing “touch the human soul,” she said, adding that the negotiations were a “combination of reason and heart.”

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Meeting coverage from the United Nations

Queries Raised about Consensus, Clarity on State Responsibility, Victim Assistance

The Conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons considered a new version of the draft convention today [June 27], following the read-through of the earlier version last week, when delegations made proposals and suggestions.

Pushing ahead towards concluding with a final version by 7 July, Conference President Elayne Whyte Gómez (Costa Rica) presented a revised version of the draft instrument (document A/CONF.229/2017/CRP.1/REV.1), saying that in reviewing the draft “article by article”, her main focus had been on points of convergence..

Video from Press TV

Starting from the top, she said, the title had changed, referring to a “treaty”, the clear preference expressed by many delegations. However, the change in title would in no way affect the instrument’s legal status, she emphasized. Rather, it placed the draft convention on the same level as the many treaties negotiated over the decades with the aim of advancing progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

She went on to note that the draft preamble’s basic structure remained largely unchanged, although it did elaborate significantly on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and more accurately characterize the legal basis upon which the treaty would rest. New paragraphs had been added to recall essential principled efforts of the United Nations, reaffirm the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and recognize the roles of women and men in the disarmament process. While the draft preamble was relatively long compared to other multilateral treaties in the nuclear field, she said, hopefully it provided a clear and precise narrative.

Concerning safeguards, she said consultations on the matter had revealed a number of complicated and technical issues, adding that she would continue to consult on the appropriate way to incorporate elements from the Annex into the first draft. The most significant innovation in the revised draft was in article 4, she added.

Following overwhelming interest from delegations, the draft now incorporated the so-called “join-then-destroy” pathway, she continued, underlining the contributions of South Africa, Austria, and Sweden. Article 4 now provided an option for States possessing nuclear weapons to join the treaty at an early date, subject to the obligation to eliminate its nuclear weapons arsenal. A considerable amount of flexibility had been built into that approach, because it must be fit to accommodate the widely varying nature of existing nuclear weapons programmes.

She said the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had been carefully limited to verification of nuclear material in peaceful activities, in accordance with its current safeguards system. The so-called South Africa-plus pathway had also been retained, having been brought into line with the current safeguards system. The option to pursue additional protocols, including through negotiations with non-signatory States, had been retained as well. “Many delegations considered that it would be appropriate, prudent and wise to retain this option,” she stressed.

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Article 9, on meetings of States parties, now elaborated specific items that could be considered in light of various provisions of the draft, she continued, adding that there was also a new provision to allow the convening of extraordinary meetings. The main change in the article on amendments was that it now provided for the consideration of proposed amendments at a conference dedicated for that purpose, in accordance with the normal parameters set forth in many treaties. Articles 4, 14 and 15 had been modified to allow the treaty to remain open for signature indefinitely, she said. And finally, the text of Article 19 had been modelled on the Arms Trade Treaty’s corresponding provision on relations with other agreements.

With the floor open for general comments, several delegates said they were awaiting instructions from their capitals. Iran’s representative emphasized the need for consensus on what exactly the treaty aimed to do. Proposing the deletion of Articles 2-4, he said such provisions were highly technical and complex, and requiring additional attention and time. Noting that several of his delegation’s suggestions for the draft preamble had been left out, he declared: “The revised text is far from a consensus text.”

Austria’s representative said a number of issues remained outstanding, particularly concerning Article 2 on declarations and Article 3 on safeguards. Article 14 on signatures could benefit from including the time and place where the treaty would be opened for signature, he added.

Ecuador’s representative referred to Article 7 on victim assistance, saying it was important to look at things from the victims’ point of view. That article must be strengthened to help alleviate the plight of victims and also to address environmental challenges, he said, stressing also that it should not be possible to withdraw from the treaty.

The representative of the Netherlands expressed disappointment that the revised text did not eliminate his concerns about the draft treaty’s effectiveness and its relationship with existing instruments. Its goal was to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime, rather than to undermine it, he emphasized.

South Africa’s representative underlined the need to resume negotiations in “one common space” so as to develop the draft instrument. “It is not going to be the Secretariat that gives us a treaty,” she pointed out.

The observer for the State of Palestine said the revised version addressed a number of loopholes, despite worries relating to Article 2. There must be clarity on State responsibility, he stressed, insisting also that, given the nature of prohibition, there must not be any possibility of withdrawal.

Also speaking today were representatives of Malaysia, Argentina, Cuba, Ireland, Nigeria, Costa Rica, Mozambique, Liechtenstein, Antigua and Barbuda (on behalf of the Caribbean Community), Brazil, Switzerland, Thailand, Guatemala, Egypt, New Zealand, Sweden, Peru, Mexico, Chile and Algeria.

The Conference will reconvene in plenary session at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 29 June.

DISARMAMENT & SECURITY .

An article by Alyn Ware from Unfold Zero

United Nations negotiations for a legal agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons resumed in New York on June 15.

The negotiations look set to achieve the adoption of a historic nuclear ban treaty on July 7. However, States in the negotiations are struggling to find agreement on elements of the treaty that could impact most on the policies and practices of the nuclear-armed States.

Nuclear-armed States and those under extended nuclear deterrence relationships, with the exception of Netherlands, are absent from the negotiations. Netherlands is not expected to join the final treaty. This simplifies the negotiations, as they involve getting agreement from non-nuclear States to prohibit, in their territories, weapons which already they do not support, possess or host.

As such, it is expected that the treaty will be concluded and ready to adopt on July 7, the final day of the negotiations.

In general, the treaty will not affect the policies and practices of the nuclear armed States and their nuclear allies, as long as they remain out of the treaty. However, there are a number of proposed elements of the draft treaty which could impact directly on them. Agreement on these proposals is proving to be difficult to achieve. They include proposals to prohibit the transit of, threat to use, and financing of nuclear weapons.

Transit

Some States and NGOs have proposed that the treaty should prohibit the transit of nuclear weapons through their territorial waters and airspace. States supporting such a ban say that it would be contrary to the purposes of the treaty to ban nuclear weapons in general, but then allow nuclear armed ships and aircraft into one’s ports, territorial waters, airports and skies.

States opposing a ban on transit argue that it would be impossible to implement, verify or enforce such a prohibition. They argue that the nuclear armed States are not transparent about which vessels (ships, submarines, airplanes) are carrying nuclear weapons, and whether vessels carrying nuclear weapons are transiting the waters and airspace of other countries.

However, the experience of New Zealand, which prohibited nuclear weapons in 1987, indicates that it is possible to ensure compliance with a nuclear weapons prohibition on ships, submarines and airplanes making port visits or landings in one’s territory, and that a prohibition on transit through territorial waters and airspace could be adopted without requiring verification.

For a more in-depth discussion on this issue, see The ban treaty, transit and national implementation.

Nuclear deterrence and the threat to use nuclear weapons

The threat to use nuclear weapons is central to the policies and practices of the nuclear armed States and their allies.

Nuclear weapons have not been used in wartime since 1945. Indeed, nuclear armed States have affirmed that the core function of nuclear arsenals is not to use these weapons, but to prevent their use through nuclear deterrence, i.e. the threat of their use. A nuclear ban treaty which is silent on the legality of the threat to use nuclear weapons would therefore provide little challenge to nuclear deterrence policies of the nuclear armed States and their allies.

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Despite (or perhaps because of) this, there is reluctance by a number of the negotiating States to include in the treaty a prohibition on the threat to use nuclear weapons. The initial draft of the treaty did not mention threat of use.

Advocacy by some governments and NGOs, including the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), has managed to get an affirmation of the illegality of the threat to use nuclear weapons into the preamble of the revised draft. (See IALANA: Ban treaty should affirm the current illegality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons).

However, it is uncertain whether a prohibition on threat to use nuclear weapons will make it into the principal obligations in the final treaty. On June 22, IALANA released a Lawyers’ Letter on the abolition of nuclear weapons, endorsed by over 400 members of the legal profession, highlighting the need to codify in the ban treaty the illegality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons.

Financing of nuclear weapons production – stopping the nuclear arms merchants

UNFOLD ZERO, PNND and the Basel Peace Office are campaigning to include in the ban treaty a prohibition on the financing of, and investments in, corporations manufacturing nuclear weapons and their dedicated delivery systems.

Nuclear-armed states currently spend US$100 billion collectively on nuclear weapons programs annually. The corporations manufacturing the weapons and their delivery systems are a major driver of the nuclear arms race. They actively lobby their parliaments and governments to continue allocating the funds to nuclear weapons. And they support think tanks and other public initiatives to promote the ‘need’ for nuclear weapons maintenance, modernization or expansion.

Many non-nuclear States support this through public funds which invest in nuclear weapons corporations, and by permitting banks and other financial institutions in their countries to also invest in these corporations.

If all of the Sates joining the nuclear ban treaty divested their public funds from these corporations, and disallowed banks from investing in them, it could radically change the economics of the nuclear arms industry. It would damage the credibility of and investor confidence in corporations manufacturing nuclear weapons. And it would give support to efforts of parliamentarians and civil society in the nuclear arms States to cut the exorbitant nuclear arms budgets and re-direct these funds to health, education, jobs, environment and sustainable development.

A number of States participating in the nuclear ban treaty negotiations have supported the proposal that the treaty prohibit financing of, and investments in, nuclear weapons. However, other States argue that this would be too difficult to implement, despite the fact that a number of countries (Lichtenstein, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland) have already implemented nuclear divestment policies.

UNFOLD ZERO, PNND and Basel Peace Office submitted a working paper to the UN negotiations on this issue. In addition, we held a press conference and addressed an informal session of negotiating States at the UN in Geneva on June 1-2, and gave an Intervention on financing of nuclear weapons to the UN negotiations in New York on June 19.

The final ban treaty, which we expect to be adopted on July 7, will provide support for nuclear divestment regardless of whether it includes a specific prohibition on financing of nuclear weapons production, or a more general prohibition on assisting nuclear weapons production. We therefore plan to launch a global nuclear weapons divestment campaign following the adoption of the treaty.

DISARMAMENT & SECURITY .

An article from the United Nations

President Presents Revised Preamble, Noting Proposed Addition of New Paragraphs

Delegations considering an instrument that would prohibit nuclear weapons concluded their first-read through of the entire draft this morning [June 21], before proceeding to informal discussions in the afternoon.

prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, resumed its consideration of Articles 11 to 21 (document A/CONF.229/2017/CRP.1).

 Having begun the discussion yesterday afternoon, delegates continued to present their positions, making amendments and suggesting revisions to language in the draft.

Ecuador’s representative, noting the “legal confusion” contained in the draft instrument under consideration, emphasized that the negotiations currently under way and the outcome instrument were not intended merely to complement prior agreements.  “We came here to negotiate a separate instrument, even though it is still related to the wider architecture of disarmament.”

Indonesia’s representative reiterated a sentiment expressed yesterday about Article 11, concerning “amendments”, underlining the need to clarify who exactly could make changes to the final instrument.  On another note, he said that although it was the sovereign right of each State party to withdraw from any instrument, provisions must be put in place to ensure that was done in the “most proper way”.  Any withdrawal must be taken very seriously, he added.

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Fiji’s representative echoed statements made by several other Pacific delegations throughout discussions in pointing out that nuclear testing had unfortunately come to define the region.  Expressing “utmost faith” that the draft instrument would be a “game-changer”, not only for the Pacific but also the entire world, he voiced support for Article 17, which states that the articles are not subject to reservations.  Such a clause would make the instrument most effective, he said.

Conference President Elayne Whyte Gómez (Costa Rica) presented a revised version of the preamble to the draft instrument, noting that a total of three dozen new paragraphs had been proposed.  She said that, in trying to address all suggestions, she had incorporated proposals that could take the preamble towards consensus, adding that she had also tried to consolidate proposals that would ensure strict avoidance of repetitions in the text.  The preamble must be as short as possible in order to be similar to that of related legal instruments.

Highlighting some of the most significant changes, she said that she had tried, in paragraph 2, to incorporate the risk posed by nuclear weapons to people, health and humanity’s very survival.  Paragraph 3 had been expanded to incorporate the disproportionate impact of nuclear-weapon activities on indigenous peoples.  A paragraph on relationships with other instruments had also been consolidated by the addition of a reference to the pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.  Also added to the last paragraph of the draft preamble — as suggested by several delegations — were references to the role of civil society and academia in furthering the principles of humanity.

Also speaking today were representatives of Mexico, Venezuela, Singapore, Thailand, Nigeria, Philippines, Peru, Guatemala, Malaysia, Argentina and Brazil.

Others addressing the meeting were speakers representing the following entities:  the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Pace University, the International Disarmament Institute and the Centre for International Security and Policy Studies (Kazakhstan).

The Conference will reconvene in open session at a date and time to be announced.