DISARMAMENT & SECURITY .

An article by by Andreas Bummel for the Inter Press Service

Earlier this month [July], the European Parliament adopted its annual recommendations on the European Union’s policy at the upcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly that begins in September.

The document pointed out that the EU “should play a proactive part in building a United Nations that can contribute effectively to global solutions, peace and security, human rights, development, democracy and a rule-of-law-based international order.”

Among other things, the European Parliament called on EU governments to foster a debate “on the topic of establishing a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly with a view to increasing the democratic profile and internal democratic process of the organisation and to allow world civil society to be directly associated in the decision-making process.”

For more than twenty years the European Parliament has been pushing for a UN Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA). Six years ago it called on EU governments to promote its establishment.

The Council’s working group on the UN had a brief internal discussion at the time and concluded that the creation of a UNPA would imply a modification of the UN’s Charter which was considered unrealistic. It was also said that it would be a paradox for the UN to establish a UNPA since there are member states that do not have a democratically elected parliament. Finally, the point was made that a UNPA would entail high costs that the UN and governments would be unable to bear.

The Council did not engage with the parliament or anyone else pertaining these and other arguments. Its consideration of the issue was superficial. Ironically, it is easier for the UN to create a UNPA than to add just one single seat to the UN Security Council. Other than the Council seemed to believe, while the latter indeed requires an amendment of the Charter, the former clearly does not.

A UNPA can be created according to Article 22 which allows the General Assembly to establish subsidiary bodies as it deems necessary to fulfill its work. A UNPA could be seen as part of the assembly’s “revitalization”, a topic that has been pursued for long but did not yield much results so far.

Each year, Freedom House in Washington D.C. publishes its assessment of democracy in the world and today nearly two thirds of UN member states are considered to be “electoral democracies”. The foundation warns, however, that democracy is increasingly under threat by populist and nationalistic forces as well as authoritarian powers.

Proponents of a UNPA keep pointing out that giving parliamentarians a voice at the UN would help strengthening democracy especially in countries where it is still weak and under pressure. Opposition politicians certainly would benefit from a seat in a UNPA and the international exposure that would go along with it.

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Proposals for Reform of the United Nations: Are they sufficiently radical?

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After all, it has been a key argument that if the UN’s promotion of democracy is to be credible, the world organization itself needs to democratize as well. The establishment of a UNPA could also be understood as a response to Sustainable Development Goal 16. SDG 16 targets include the development of “effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels” and ensuring “responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.” Why should the UN, of all things, be excluded from this?

A UN parliamentary body could be a useful complement to the High-Level Political Forum on sustainable development in order to review the implementation of the SDGs.

At the beginning, a UNPA need not be a monumental investment. It depends on the specifics. So far, neither the Council of the EU or anyone else has come up with a thorough calculation. How can you argue that the costs would be too high if you never calculated them in the first place?

Under US President Donald Trump multilateralism and UN funding are under threat. This should be a wake-up call. To a large degree, a UNPA would be educational. It would bring the UN closer to lawmakers in the capitals and could help strengthen budgetary support of UN member states. In the long run, strengthening the UN’s democratic profile could turn out to be a good investment.

When she was an Italian deputy, the EU’s High Representative on Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, endorsed a UNPA and last year she confirmed that she still believes that it “could be a very useful tool.”

For a long time, EU governments have been ignoring the European Parliament’s endorsement of a UNPA. Will it be different this time?

Although a debate on this topic is not unrealistic, it is premature to expect that there will be a formal push in the upcoming session of the UN General Assembly. Most UN member states, including those from the EU, never looked into the concept of a UNPA in a serious way and will have to do their homework first.

Support like it was expressed by Malta’s foreign minister George Vella, who was succeeded last month, or by the cabinet of Italy’s foreign minister Paolo Gentiloni, who is now Italy’s Prime Minister, was the exception.

In May an informal meeting in New York hosted by the Canadian UN mission in collaboration with the international Campaign for a UNPA brought together representatives of 12 governments for a briefing on the proposal. This was a sign of growing interest.

More such informal meetings seem to be the most likely way forward for the time being. In the process, several EU governments – and other UN member states – may declare their support in one way or another which eventually could bring it on the EU’s and the UN’s agenda.

In particular, it will be interesting to see what position the new French government under President Emmanuel Macron will take.

The author, Andreas Bummel, is Director of Democracy Without Borders and Coordinator of the Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly.

DISARMAMENT & SECURITY .

An article by the Campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly [highlights by CPNN]

At an event convened by Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) in The Hague on May 15, representatives of regional parliaments, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) and academia came together to explore mechanisms to increase democratic representation and accountability of the United Nations.

Click on photo to enlarge

The Roundtable that was hosted by the House of Representatives of the Netherlands with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands provided an opportunity to exchange ideas and to assess options like the creation of a UNPA or an improvement of existing mechanisms. The opening remarks were delivered by the even’s co-hosts Pieter Omtzigt, a member of the Dutch House of Representatives, and Nico Schrijver, member of the Dutch Senate, both of which are also members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

The first panel was started with a presentation by Andreas Bummel, coordinator of the UNPA Campaign, who stressed the need for creating a formal parliamentary body at the UN that would provide new space for members of parliament to be involved in the UN’s work. He said that the campaign’s goal was a UNPA vested with distinctive rights and powers that could be created, in a first step, by the UN General Assembly based on Article 22 of the UN Charter. He suggested that the apportionment of seats should be based on the principle of “degressive propotionality” which means that on a sliding scale smaller states would get more seats per capita than larger ones.

According to the second speaker, Anda Filip, Director of External Relations at IPU, the IPU already attempts to bring the voices of parliaments and parliamentarians to the UN and its agenda. She said that going through the IPU as an institution separate from the UN would maintain a clear separation of powers and promote independence and autonomy. She suggested that existing tools provided for by the IPU should be strengthened instead of creating new institutions.

Hans Köchler, Professor emeritus at the University of Innsbruck and President of International Progress Organization, elaborated on the democratic deficit at the UN, in particular with respect to the Security Council and the veto privilege of its five permanent members. He argued that a UNPA would represent an important step towards making the UN more democratic and raised the idea that such a new body might be better suited to monitor and oversee actions and decisions of the Security Council.

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Proposals for Reform of the United Nations: Are they sufficiently radical?

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Subsequently, Charles Santiago, a member of parliament from Malaysia, shared his experiences as legislator and chair of the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) whose objective is to investigate and raise awareness of human rights violations in the Asian South Eastern states. In particular, he elaborated on the difficulties of establishing an inter-parliamentary assembly with consultative powers within ASEAN, given that member states insist on the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs.

The second session on lessons-learned from regional parliaments and organizations was opened and facilitated by Margareta Cederfelt, member of parliament from Sweden, Chair of PGA’s International Council and member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). As an introduction, Mrs. Cederfelt briefly explained the mandate of the OSCE which consists of 57 participating states from Canada to Mongolia.

Among other things, the panelists discussed the added benefits of regional parliaments and the challenges that arise from working in both regional and national parliament at the same time. According to Felipe Michelini, a former member of parliament from Uruguay and of the Latin-American Parliament, it was PGA and not regional parliaments that helped mobilize legislators so that Latin-American countries would join the International Criminal Court despite pressure from the US against doing so.

The Vice-President of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), Bernadette Lahai, shared her experiences in the African parliamentary body and as a member of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, a transregional parliamentary body created to democratize the framework of development cooperation. She discussed the structure of PAP, how members are elected and the roles they fulfill. Based on this she provided examples of the roles that a UNPA could play such as monitoring implementation processes and making recommendations to the UN General Assembly. She suggested that the preparations for the creation of a new parliamentary body at the UN would benefit from studying the powers and operations of existing international parliamentary bodies.

The second session ended with remarks from Niels Blokker, a Professor at Leiden University and former Deputy Legal Advisor at the Dutch Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who presented his research on different types of international parliamentary bodies. With regard to a UNPA he raised questions such as whether each state should have the same number of MPs or if it should vary by population size or whether or not the body should have budgetary or legislative powers.

The event was concluded by Mr. Schrijver and David Donat Cattin, Secretary General of PGA. As PGA’s summary of the event points out, they highlighted “the necessity of parliamentary representation in the form of a decision-making or advisory body to the UN.” At the same time, they emphasized the importance of further examining existing methods and their effectiveness. Participants were called upon to engage with this topic at the national and international levels, in particular, to determine which existing models of regional parliamentary bodies may serve as inspiration for a UNPA.

DISARMAMENT & SECURITY .

An article by Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament

A Parliamentary Action Plan for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World was released at the United Nations in New York today, during the final few days of UN negotiations on a Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons. The release of the plan also came one day after the North Korean test of an inter-continental ballistic missile, which has raised the nuclear tensions in the North East Asian region. The Action Plan, which has been developed by Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament [PNND] in consultation with the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), includes 14 key nuclear disarmament actions that can be taken by parliamentarians.

Some of these are actions that parliamentarians from States Parties to the forthcoming nuclear prohibition treaty can take to implement the treaty in their parliaments. These are all non-nuclear States, as the nuclear-armed and allied States are not participating in the prohibition treaty.

Other actions in the Plan are those that parliamentarians from nuclear armed and allied States can take to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons being used, and move their governments to adopt incremental disarmament measures, phase out the reliance on nuclear deterrence and negotiate for nuclear disarmament.

And some actions in the Plan are those that parliamentarians from all States can take to build public awareness and political will for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The plan draws from reports and resolutions on nuclear disarmament adopted by the IPU in 2009 and 2014, as well as resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and a series of consultations undertaken by PNND in key capitals and UN centres during 2016-2017.

Actions by parliamentarians to implement the nuclear prohibition treaty

The Plan encourages parliamentarians from States that join the forthcoming nuclear weapons prohibition treaty, to implement the treaty in their parliaments by prohibiting the threat, use, production, stationing and testing of nuclear weapons in their territories.

Such actions would not impact directly on the policies and practices of the nuclear-armed States, but would reinforce a norm against nuclear weapons.

Impact on the nuclear-armed States: transit and nuclear investments

The Action Plan suggests that States Parties to the nuclear prohibition treaty could also adopt measures that are not specifically required by the nuclear prohibition treaty, but which would would impact considerably on the nuclear armed States. These measures include prohibiting transit of nuclear weapons through their territories (ports, airfields, territorial waters and airspace), and prohibiting the financing of nuclear weapons.

PNND provided information to the UN negotiations on how a national prohibition on transit of nuclear weapons can work, drawing primarily from the experience of the New Zealand nuclear weapons ban. See The Ban Treaty, Transit and National Implementation.

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Can we abolish all nuclear weapons?

A UN High-Level Conference on Nuclear Disarmament: Distraction or progress?

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PNND has joined with the World Future Council and International Peace Bureau in a project ‘Move the Nuclear Weapons Money’ which provides information about parliamentary actions in nuclear-armed States to cut nuclear weapons budgets and re-direct these funds to economic, social and environmental needs (including protecting the climate); parliamentary actions in non-nuclear States to end investments of public funds and banks in corporations manufacturing nuclear weapons and their dedicated delivery systems.

Other actions by parliamentarians in nuclear armed and allied states

The Action plan includes a number of actions that parliamentarians in nuclear-armed and allied States can take to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons use and advance nuclear disarmament measures. These includes proposals on de-alerting, no-first use, stockpile reduction, verification, transparency, establishing additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, and supporting nuclear disarmament negotiations.

The Plan includes examples of such actions in national parliaments and in inter-parliamentary bodies including the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones

The Action Plan reports on proposals and parliamentary actions for the establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones in the Middle East, Europe and North East Asia.

The NE Asia proposal is particularly relevant as a possible solution to the nuclear crisis unfolding in the region over North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile development.

UN High Level Conference on Nuclear Disarmament

The Action Plan focuses on key multilateral forums where parliamentarians can advance nuclear disarmament, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences, and the United Nations.

The Plan highlights the unique opportunity provided by the 2018 UN High Level Conference on Nuclear Disarmament. Similar UN High Level Conferences (HLCs) over the past few years have been very successful in adopting global agreements on sustainable development goals (2015), climate change (2016), refugees and migrants (2016) and oceans (2017).

The 2018 HLC on Nuclear Disarmament could build considerable political will for nuclear disarmament, if governments attend at the ‘highest level’. It could provide a forum to elevate the nuclear prohibition treaty, make progress on nuclear risk-reduction and disarmament measures by the nuclear armed States, and advance regional measures such as nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and North-East Asia.

Public awareness and political will

The Action Plan also includes a number of actions that parliamentarians can take to increase public awareness and build political will for nuclear disarmament. These include:

– Commemorating key dates including the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons;

– Endorsing the joint statement of mayors, parliamentarians and religious leaders for nuclear disarmament;

– Supporting peace and disarmament education in schools and communities including through peace parks and museums.

.DISARMAMENT & SECURITY.

An article by Unfold Zero

On July 7, 2017, the United Nations adopted a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons following negotiations over 5 weeks during March, June and July. 122 countries voted in favour of the treaty, demonstrating the clear and unequivocal acceptance of the majority of UN members never to use, threaten to use, produce, possess, acquire, transfer, test or deploy nuclear weapons. The treaty will be open for signature on September 20 and will enter-into-force once 50 States ratify.

UNFOLD ZERO promoted the negotiations, and was actively involved in them – submitting working papers, making interventions and organising side events. We are now active in the treaty implementation and follow-up. 

Impact on the nuclear armed and allied States?

The nuclear-armed and allied States opposed the treaty and none are likely to join. As such they are not bound by its provisions, and will not be directly affected by it.

However, the new treaty could be used to impact on the policies and practices of the nuclear armed States and their allies in two key ways:

1 through national implementation measures that prohibit financing and transit of nuclear weapons;

2 by putting political pressure on these States to adopt nuclear risk reduction and disarmament measures, including through the Non-Proliferation Treaty process and at the 2018 UN High-Level Conference on Nuclear Disarmament. 

National implementation: Prohibiting nuclear weapons investments

The nuclear prohibition treaty could impact on nuclear weapons policies if it results in divestment by States parties and others from corporations manufacturing nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

These corporations (list compiled by Don’t Bank on the Bomb) are a major driver of the nuclear arms race. They actively lobby their parliaments and governments to continue allocating the funds to nuclear weapons. And they support think tanks and other public initiatives to promote the ‘need’ for nuclear weapons maintenance, modernization and expansion.

Many of the countries supporting the nuclear prohibition treaty have public funds (such as national pension funds), and banks operating in their countries, that invest in these corporations.

The new treaty does not specifically prohibit such investments. However, States parties to the treaty agree not to ‘assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty.’  This can be interpreted as prohibiting investments in nuclear weapons corporations.

If a number of States Parties to the treaty, encouraged by their parliamentarians and civil society, decide to prohibit investments in nuclear weapons corporations as part of their national implementation measures, this could highlight the unethical corporate practice of manufacturing such weapons, damage the standing of such corporations and constrain their lobbying power.

UNFOLD ZERO and our partner organisations are therefore stepping up our Move the Nuclear Weapons Money campaign in order to dramatically increase the number of countries divesting from nuclear weapons corporations, focusing on those countries joining the nuclear prohibition treaty.

We are also supporting nuclear weapons divestment by cities, universities and religious institutions in nuclear-armed and allied countries, building on the example of the city of Cambridge MA (USA).

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Can we abolish all nuclear weapons?

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This divestment campaign is coupled with campaigns in the nuclear-armed States to drastically cut nuclear weapons budgets and re-direct these resources into economic, social and envirnomental need, such as prmooting renewable energy and protecting the climate.

For more information see Move the Nuclear Weapons Money: A handbook for civil society and legislators’ or contact us at UNFOLD ZERO. 

National implementation: prohibiting transit

One step that States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could take that would impact directly on the policies and practices of the nuclear armed states is to prohibit the transit of nuclear weapons through their territorial waters and airspace.

The new treaty infers that allowing such transit by nuclear-armed states would be in violation of the treaty provision under which States parties to the treaty agree not to ”assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty.’ However, the treaty leaves it up to each State party on how they implement this provision.

Some of the countries in the UN negotiations on the treaty argued that a ban on transit would be too difficult to implement, verify and enforce, especially as the nuclear-armed States refuse to confirm or deny which ships and airplanes are carrying nuclear weapons.

However, UNFOLD ZERO partner organisations Aotearoa (New Zealand) Lawyers for Peace and PNND submitted a paper to the prohibition treaty negotiations reviewing the experience of New Zealand, a country which has adopted legislation prohibiting transit of nuclear weapons and has been successful in implementing this. We are therefore encouraging States Parties to the treaty to include a prohibition on transit in their national implementation measures.

Nuclear armed and allied States have easily dismissed the Treaty on the prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as not relevant to them and which they can ignore. It is not so easy for them to ignore the 2018 UN High-Level Conference on Nuclear Disarmament (2018 UNHLC).

There is a general expectation (from media, parliaments, civil society and other governments) that governments will participate in UN high-level conferences at the highest level, i.e. by the President or Prime Minister, and that these conferences will deliver concrete outcomes.

As such, recent UN high-level conferences have been very successful, resulting in the adoption of the sustainable development goals, Paris agreement on climate change, NY declaration on refugees and migrants and the 14-point action plan to protect the oceans.

Already the 56 member parliaments of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (which includes the parliaments of four nuclear armed and all the NATO countries) have called ”on all participating OSCE States to participate in the 2018 UN international conference on nuclear disarmament at the highest level, to include parliamentarians in their delegations to the conference and to pursue the adoption of nuclear risk reduction, transparency and disarmament measures at the conference.” (Tblisi Declaration, adopted July 5, 2016)

The ban treaty could be used to put additional pressure on the nuclear-armed and allied states to undertake such measures.

The 2018 UNHLC could also be an opportunity for non-nuclear countries to announce their ratification of the nuclear prohibition treaty. If 50 ratifications are achieved by the 2018 UNHLC, then this could be the occasion to announce its entry-into-force.

UNFOLD ZERO is coordinating civil society action for the 2018 UNHLC in cooperation with the Abolition 2000 Working Group on the 2018 UNHLC. Please contact us at info@unfoldzero.org if you would like to be more involved.

. DISARMAMENT & SECURITY.

An article by the International Red Cross

Over 120 countries today adopted a landmark treaty banning nuclear weapons. The agreement comes at a time when the world has again been reminded of the threat of nuclear weapons.

“Today, the world has taken an historic step towards de-legitimising these indiscriminate and inhumane weapons, which is a crucial basis for their future elimination,” said ICRC President Peter Maurer speaking in Geneva. “The agreement is an important victory for our shared humanity.

“For too long nuclear weapons have remained the only weapon of mass destruction not explicitly prohibited in international law. The treaty adopted today fills this gap,” he said.

The ICRC has actively participated in the negotiations at the United Nations in New York which adopted the treaty. It advocated that the treaty recognize the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, that it be based on international humanitarian law, and that it contain a clear and unambiguous prohibition.

The treaty adopted on Friday meets these objectives. It provides a solid foundation for resisting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and forges a path towards their eventual elimination. It will enter into force when 50 States have ratified the treaty, an effort that will be supported by the ICRC and Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies around the world.

Speaking at the negotiations, the Head of the ICRC’s Arms Unit, Kathleen Lawand, praised States for reaching agreement. She said, “The treaty will reinforce the stigma against the use of nuclear weapons. Yet, we know that the adoption of this treaty by itself will not make nuclear weapons disappear overnight. Our collective work is far from complete.”

The ICRC, along with the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, have long called for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. In 1945, ICRC doctors were among the first to respond to the devastation following the use of atomic bombs in Japan. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences were clear then, and the suffering continues today.

“Nuclear weapons are some of the most terrifying weapons ever invented. They cause unspeakable human suffering and irreversible environmental harm and are a threat to the survival of humanity itself,” said President Maurer.

Can we abolish all nuclear weapons?

. DISARMAMENT & SECURITY.

A blog by Richard Falk

On 7 July 2017 122 countries at the UN voted to approve the text of a proposed international treaty entitled ‘Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.’ The treaty is formally open for signature in September, but it only become a binding legal instrument according to its own provisions 90 days after the 50th country deposits with the UN Secretary General its certification that the treaty has been ratified in accordance with their various constitutional processes.

In an important sense, it is incredible that it took 72 years after the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to reach this point of setting forth this unconditional prohibition of any use or threat of nuclear weapons [Article 1(e)] within the framework of a multilateral treaty negotiated under UN auspices. The core obligation of states that choose to become parties to the treaty is very sweeping. It prohibits any connection whatsoever with the weaponry by way of possession, deployment, testing, transfer, storage, and production [Article 1(a)].

The Nuclear Ban Treaty (NBT) is significant beyond the prohibition. It can and should be interpreted as a frontal rejection of the geopolitical approach to nuclearism, and its contention that the retention and development of nuclear weapons is a proven necessity given the way international society is organized. It is a healthy development that the NBT shows an impatience toward and a distrust of the elaborate geopolitical rationalizations of the nuclear status quo that have ignored the profound objections to nuclearism of many governments and the anti-nuclear views that have long dominated world public opinion. The old reassurances about being committed to nuclear disarmament as soon as an opportune moment arrives increasingly lack credibility as the nuclear weapons states, led by the United States, make huge investments in the modernization and further development of their nuclear arsenals.

Despite this sense of achievement, it must be admitted that there is a near fatal weakness, or at best, the gaping hole in this newly cast net of prohibition established via the NBT process. True, 122 governments lends weight to the claim that the international community, by a significant majority has signaled in an obligatory way a repudiation of nuclear weapons for any and all purposes, and formalized their prohibition of any action to the contrary. The enormous fly in this healing ointment arises from the refusal of any of the nine nuclear weapons states to join in the NBT process even to the legitimating extent of participating in the negotiating conference with the opportunity to express their objections and influence the outcome. As well, most of the chief allies of these states that are part of the global security network of states relying directly and indirectly on nuclear weaponry also boycotted the entire process. It is also discouraging to appreciate that several countries in the past that had lobbied against nuclear weapons with great passion such as India, Japan, and China were notably absent, and also opposed the prohibition. This posture of undisguised opposition to this UN sponsored undertaking to delegitimize nuclearism, while reflecting the views of a minority of governments, must be taken extremely seriously. It includes all five permanent members of the Security Council and such important international actors as Germany and Japan.

The NATO triangle of France, United Kingdom, and the United States, three of the five veto powers in the Security Council, angered by its inability to prevent the whole NBT venture, went to the extreme of issuing a Joint Statement of denunciation, the tone of which was disclosed by a defiant assertion removing any doubt as to the abiding commitment to a nuclearized world order: “We do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party to it. Therefore, there will be no change in the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons.” The body of the statement contended that global security depended upon maintaining the nuclear status quo, as bolstered by the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 and by the claim that it was “the policy of nuclear deterrence, which has been essential to keeping the peace in Europe and North Asia for over 70 years.” It is relevant to take note of the geographic limits associated with the claimed peace-maintaining benefits of nuclear weaponry, which ignores the ugly reality that devastating warfare has raged throughout this period outside the feared mutual destruction of the heartlands of geopolitical rivals, a central shared forbearance by the two nuclear superpowers throughout the entire Cold War. During these decades of rivalry, the violent dimensions of geopolitical rivalry were effectively outsourced to the non-Western regions of the world during the Cold War, and subsequently, causing massive suffering and widespread devastation for many vulnerable peoples inhabiting the Global South. Such a conclusion suggests that even if we were to accept the claim on behalf on nuclear weapons as deserving of credit for avoiding a major war, specifically World War III, that ‘achievement’ was accomplished at the cost of millions, probably tens of millions, of civilian lives in non-Western societies. Beyond this, the achievement involved a colossally irresponsible gamble with the human future, and succeeded as much due to good luck as to the rationality attributed to deterrence theory and practice.

NBT itself does not itself challenge the Westphalian framework of state-centrism by setting forth a framework of global legality that is issued under the authority of ‘the international community’ or the UN as the authoritative representative of the peoples of the world. Its provisions are carefully formulated as imposing obligation only with respect to ‘State parties,’ that is, governments that have deposited the prescribed ratification and thereby become formal adherents of the treaty. Even Article 4, which hypothetically details how nuclear weapons states should divest themselves of all connections with the weaponry limits its claims to State parties, and offers no guidance whatsoever in the event of suspected or alleged non-compliance. Reliance is placed in Article 5 on a commitment to secure compliance by way of the procedures of ‘national implementation.’

The treaty does aspire to gain eventual universality through the adherence of all states over time, but in the interim the obligations imposed are of minimal substantive relevance beyond the agreement of the non-nuclear parties not to accept deployment or other connections with the weaponry. It is for another occasion, but I believe a strong case can be made under present customary international law, emerging global law, and abiding natural law that the prohibitions in the NBT are binding universally independent of whether a state chooses or not to become a party to the treaty.

Taking an unnecessary further step to reaffirm statism, and specifically, ‘national sovereignty’ as the foundation of world order, Article 17 gives parties to the NBT a right of withdrawal. All that state parties have to do is give notice, accompanied by a statement of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ that have ‘jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.’ The withdrawal will take effect twelve months after the notice and statement are submitted. There is no procedure in the treaty by which the contention of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ can be challenged as unreasonable or made in bad faith. It is an acknowledgement that even for these non-nuclear states, nothing in law or morality or human wellbeing takes precedence over the exercise of sovereign rights. Article 17 is not likely to be invoked in the foreseeable future. This provision reminds us of this strong residual unwillingness to supersede national interests by deference to global and human interests. The withdrawal option is also important because it confirms that national security continues to take precedence over international law, even with respect to genocidal weaponry of mass destruction. As such the obligation undertaken by parties to the NBT are reversible in ways that are not present in multilateral conventions outlawing genocide, apartheid, and torture.

Given these shortcomings, is it nevertheless reasonable for nuclear abolitionists to claim a major victory by virtue of tabling such a treaty? Considering that the nuclear weapons states and their allies have all rejected the process and even those within the circle of the intended legal prohibition reserve a right of withdrawal, the NBT is likely to be brushed aside by cynics as mere wishful thinking and by dedicated anti-nuclearists as more of an occasion for hemlock than champagne. The cleavage between the nuclear weapons states and the rest of the world has never been starker, and there are absent any signs on either side of the divide to make the slightest effort to find common ground, and there may be none. As of now, it is a standoff between two forms of asymmetry. The nuclear states enjoy a preponderance of hard power, while the anti-nuclear states have the upper hand when it comes to soft power, including solid roots in ‘substantive democracy,’ ‘global law,’ and ‘natural law.’

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Can we abolish all nuclear weapons?

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The hard power solution to nuclearism has essentially been reflexive, that is, relying on nuclearism as shaped by the leading nuclear weapons states. What this has meant in practice is some degree of self-restraint on the battlefield and crisis situations (there is a nuclear taboo without doubt, although it has never been seriously tested), and, above all, a delegitimizing one-sided implementation of the Nonproliferation Treaty regime. This one-sidedness manifests itself in two ways: (1) discriminatory administration of the underlying non-proliferation norm, most unreservedly in the case of Israel; as well, the excessive enforcement of the nonproliferation norm beyond the limits of either the NPT itself or the UN Charter, as with Iraq (2003), and currently by way of threats of military attack against North Korea and Iran. Any such uses of military force would be non-defensive and unlawful unless authorized by a Security Council resolution supported by all five permanent members, and at least four other states, which fortunately remains unlikely. [UN Charter, Article 27(3)] More likely is recourse to unilateral coercion led by the countries that issued the infamous joint declaration denouncing the NBT as was the case for the U.S. and the UK with regard to recourse to the war against Iraq, principally rationalized as a counter-proliferation undertaking, which turned out itself to be a rather crude pretext for mounting an aggressive war, showcasing ‘shock and awe’ tactics.

(2) The failure to respect the obligations imposed on the nuclear weapons states to negotiate in good faith an agreement to eliminate these weapons by verified and prudent means, and beyond this to seek agreement on general and complete disarmament. It should have been evident, almost 50 years after the NPT came into force in 1970 that nuclear weapons states have breached their material obligations under the treaty, which were validated by an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996 that included a unanimous call for the implementation of these Article VI legal commitments. Drawing this conclusion from deeds as well as words, it is evident for all with eyes that want to see, that the nuclear weapons states as a group have opted for deterrence as a permanent security scheme and nonproliferation as its management mechanism.

One contribution of the NBT is convey to the world the crucial awareness of these 122 countries as reinforced by global public opinion that the deterrence/NPT approach to global peace and security is neither prudent nor legitimate nor a credible pathway leading over time to the end of nuclearism.

In its place, the NBT offers its own two-step approach—first, an unconditional stigmatizing of the use or threat of nuclear weapons to be followed by a negotiated process seeking nuclear disarmament. Although the NBT is silent about demilitarizing geopolitics and conventional disarmament, it is widely assumed that latter stages of denuclearization would not be implemented unless they involved these broader assaults on the war system. The NBT is also silent about the relevance of nuclear power capabilities, which inevitably entail a weapons option given widely available current technological knowhow. The relevance of nuclear energy technology would have to be addressed at some stage of nuclear disarmament.

Having suggested these major shortcomings of treaty coverage and orientation, can we, should we cast aside these limitations, and join in the celebrations and renewed hopes of civil society activists to rid the world of nuclear weapons? My esteemed friend and colleague, David Krieger, who has dedicated his life to keeping the flame of discontent about nuclear weapons burning and serves as the longtime and founding President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, concludes his informed critique of the Joint Statement by NATO leaders, with this heartening thought: “Despite the resistance of the U.S., UK and France, the nuclear ban treaty marks the beginning of the end of the nuclear age.” [Krieger, “U.S., UK and France Denounce the Nuclear Ban Treaty”]. I am not at all sure about this, although Krieger’s statement leaves open the haunting uncertainty of how long it might take to move from this ‘beginning’ to the desired ‘end.’ Is it as self-styled ‘nuclear realists’ like to point out, no more than an ultimate goal, which is polite coding for the outright dismissal of nuclear disarmament as ‘utopian’ or ‘unattainable’?

We should realize that there have been many past ‘beginnings of the end’ since 1945 that have not led us any closer to the goal of the eliminating the scourge of nuclearism from the face of the earth. It is a long and somewhat arbitrary list, including the immediate horrified reactions of world leaders to the atomic bomb attacks at the end of World War II, and what these attacks suggested about the future of warfare; the massive anti-nuclear civil disobedience campaigns that briefly grabbed mass attention in several nuclear weapons states; tabled disarmament proposals by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1960s; the UN General Assembly Resolution 1653 (XVI) that in 1961 declared threat or use of nuclear weapons to be unconditionally unlawful under the UN Charter and viewed any perpetrator as guilty of a crime against humanity; the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 that scared many into the momentary realization that it was not tolerable to coexist with nuclear weapons; the International Court of Justice majority opinion in 1996 responding to the General Assembly’s question about the legality of nuclear weapons that limited the possibility of legality of use to the narrow circumstance of responding to imminent threats to the survival of a sovereign state; the apparent proximity to an historic disarmament arrangements agreed to by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev at a summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland in 1986; the extraordinary opening provided by the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which should have been the best possible ‘beginning of the end,’ and yet nothing happened; and finally, Barack Obama’s Prague speech is 2009 (echoing sentiments expressed less dramatically by Jimmy Carter in 1977, early in his presidency) in which he advocated to great acclaim dedicated efforts to achieve toward the elimination of nuclear weapons if not in his lifetime, at least as soon as possible; it was a good enough beginning for a Nobel Peace Prize, but then one more fizzle.

Each of these occasions briefly raised the hopes of humanity for a future freed from a threat of nuclear war, and its assured accompanying catastrophe, and yet there was few, if any, signs of progress from each of these beginnings greeted so hopefully toward the ending posited as a goal. Soon disillusionment, denial, and distraction overwhelmed the hopes raised by these earlier initiatives, with the atmosphere of hope in each instance replaced by an aura of nuclear complacency, typified by indifference and denial. It is important to acknowledge that the bureaucratic and ideological structures supporting nuclearism are extremely resilient, and have proved adept at outwaiting the flighty politics of periodic flurries of anti-nuclear activism.

And after a lapse of years, yet another new beginning is now being proclaimed. We need to summon and sustain greater energy than in the past if we are to avoid this fate of earlier new beginnings in relation to the NBT. Let this latest beginning start a process that moves steadily toward the end that has been affirmed. We know that the NBT would not itself have moved forward without civil society militancy and perseverance at every stage. The challenge now is to discern and then take the next steps, and not follow the precedents of the past that followed the celebration of a seeming promising beginning with a misplaced reliance on the powers that be to handle the situation, and act accordingly. In the past, the earlier beginnings were soon buried, acute concerns eventually resurfaced, and yet another new beginning was announced with fanfare while the earlier failed beginning were purged from collective memory.

Here, we can at least thank the infamous Joint Statement for sending a clear signal to civil society and the 122 governments voting their approval of the NBT text that if they are truly serious about ending nuclearism, they will have to carry on the fight, gathering further momentum, and seeking to reach a tipping point where these beginnings of the end gain enough traction to become a genuine political project, and not just another harmless daydream or well-intended empty gesture.

As of now the NBT is a treaty text that courteously mandates the end of nuclearism, but to convert this text into an effective regime of control will require the kind of deep commitments, sacrifices, movements, and struggles that eventually achieved the impossible, ending such entrenched evils as slavery, apartheid, and colonialism.